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REAL ESTATE TAX ASSESSMENTS-
A STUDY OF ILLINOIS
TAXPAYERS' JUDICIAL REMEDIES
Stanley N. Gore* and Howard C. Emmerman**
Messrs. Gore and Emmerman comment on the avenues of relief available
to Illinois real estate taxpayers faced with invalid or excessive taxes.
Problems arise due to the taxation of allegedly exempt property and the
overassessment of property subject to taxation. The statutory and judicial
remedies of injunctions and declaratory relief are examined along with the
court's "fraudulent assessment" concept. The authors criticize Illinois Su-
preme Court decisions which have effectively eliminated judicial relief
from administrative taxing body decrees.
INTRODUCTORY PROBLEM
HE Illinois Supreme Court recently has limited the judicial rem-
dies available to property taxpayers who claim that their
property has been inappropriately assessed.1 For example, as-
sume a taxpayer owns acreage of prime vacant land and has re-
ceived notice from the county assessor that the property in ques-
tion was assessed for the year 1974, at an equalized value of $175,-
000, for real estate tax purposes. Assume further, that counsel for
the taxpayer establishes before an administrative assessing body,
that the equalized value of the property was not more than $110,
000, and that the difference in actual tax dollars which the tax-
payer would pay as a result of such overassessment is in excess of
$8,000. If the assessing body refuses the request for an adjustment
of the assessment, what recourse is available to the taxpayer who is
not in a position to pay the $8,000 disputed taxes?
In all likelihood, the only recourse is to find a buyer who can
afford to pay the taxes. One cannot expect any probable avenue
of relief in the courts unless he can first pay the taxes under
*Partner, Rudnick, Wolfe, Snyderman & Foreman; Chicago, Illinois.
** Associate, Rudnick, Wolfe, Synderman & Foreman; Chicago, Illinois.
1. See text accompanying notes 66-75 infra.
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protest; only then will he receive some measure of judicial review.
But pursuing this course has its risks. If the court does not find the
assessment sufficiently erroneous to warrant reversal, the disputed
taxes paid are unaffected.
This Article will detail the prevailing law affecting the available
avenues of judicial relief. By virtue of the dichotomies drawn in
the case law on the subject, the topic will be divided as follows: (1)
property allegedly exempt from taxation or subjected to a tax alleg-
edly unauthorized by law; and (2) property allegedly over-as-
sessed.
PROPERTY EXEMPT FROM TAXATION OR MADE SUBJECT
TO AN UNAUTHORIZED TAX
Pursuant to statute, and in accordance with pronouncements by
the Illinois courts, there are two general remedies available -to a
real estate taxpayer who contends that his property is exempt from
taxation or that his tax is unauthorized by law:
(1) Payment of the tax under protest and the filing of an ob-
jection action at law when the County Collector applies for judg-
ment and order of sale;
(2) Under the appropriate circumstances, injunctive or declar-
atory relief, in chancery.
Statutory Remedy
The Illinois statutes provide !that a taxpayer may, in accordance
with section 194 of the Revenue*Act, 2 first pay the taxes under pro-
test and then, pursuant to section 235 of the Act, ' file a written ob-
jection in the circuit court to the County Collector's application for
judgment and order of sale. He would thereby be given an oppor-
tunity to present evidence at a judicial hearing in support-of his ob-
jection.4 If the objection is allowed, the court is empowered to di-
rect a refund of the amount of taxes that are found to be in-
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 675 (1973)...
3. " 1d. § 716.
4. The County Collector's Application for Judgment and Order of Sale, filed
with the circuit court, is the first step, toward having all property. for which taxes
are shown delinquent on the collector's books, sold for delinquent taxes pursuant to
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 706 (1973). See also Note, Revenue and Taxation--Col-
lection of Delinquent Real Estate Taxes, 19 DEPAuL L. REV. 348, 350-51 (1969).
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valid; if the objection is overruled, the taxes paid are unaffected,
and the objection or protest is stricken.5
Once the taxpayer has made payment under protest, he has
brought himself within the class of persons to whom the statutory
remedy is available. In addition, .there exists a further condition
that must be satisfied which is not specifically set forth in the stat-
ute. The taxpayer must exhaust his administrative, remedies by
filing a complaint with the assessing body and board of appeals
or board of review. Thus, in Application of County Treasurer,6 the
Illinois appellate court held that a property owner's failure to al-
lege that he had exhausted his administrative remedies was fatal
to his objection.
It is relevant to point out that even where the taxpayer is suc-
cessful in his objection suit and the court orders a refund, the tax-
payer is not entitled to interest on the monies paid under protest.7
The rationale for this rule is as follows:
[I]nterest, being a creature of statute, is recoverable only by statute or
contract, and ... a tax collector, being -a mere trustee of public funds col-
lected for specific purposes, has no money to pay interest in the absence of
statutory authority to establish a fund for that purpose.8
However, as will be discussed later in this Article neither the legis-
lature nor the courts have demonstrated concern with whether the
taxpayer has the funds to pay the interest on the taxes, or the taxes
themselves. Indeed, once a tax sale has occurred the taxpayer must
often pay substantial sums as interest to redeem the property from
the sale.'
Injunctive Relief
Numerous decisions have firmly established the rule that a tax-
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 716 (1973). But see language in the case. of
Application of County Collector, 15 Ill. App. 3d 667, 304 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.
1973) wherein the court noted an-objection filed without-the accompanying tax
payment would nonetheless invalidate a subsequent tax sale. This was the- ruling
below on remand (72 Co. T.D. 11, Circuit Court of Cook County, Sept. 5, 1974).
6. 5 Ill. App. 3d.694, 283 N.E.2d 905 (1st Dist.. 1972);.accord, Application of
Korzen, 20 Il1. App. 3d 531, 3'14 N.E.2d 593 (1st Dist. 1974).
7. See, e.g., Lakefront Realty Corp. v. Lorenz, 19 Il1. 2d 415, 422; 167 N.E.2d
236, 240 (19.60).
8. Id. at 423, 167 N.E.2d at 240.
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 734 (1973). See Note, Reivenue and Taxation-
Collection of Delinquent Real Estate Taxes, 19 DEPAuL.L. REV. 348, 352 (1969)..,
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payer may sue to enjoin collection of a tax where the tax is levied
(a) without a legal basis, or (b) by officials without authority to
act, or (c) against exempt property.'0
Illinois statutes define certain classes of real estate as exempt
from taxation." Thus, for example, school property; 12 property
used exclusively for religious purposes; 1 property actually and ex-
clusively used for charitable purposes and not leased or otherwise
used with a view to profit;'4 and twenty-one other categories of real
property have been legislatively determined to be exempt from tax-
ation. 5 The primary use of property, rather than its incidental
use, determines its tax status.16
It is difficult to define a tax unauthorized by law because no stat-
utory enumeration is available. A tax is generally held to be unau-
thorized by law when the taxpayer receives an assessment on
property not belonging to him. Thus, in Moline Water Power Co.
v. Cox,' 7 the court enjoined collection of a tax assessed upon prop-
erty not owned by the taxpayer. The taxing authority alleged that
the taxpayer should be barred from equitable relief, on the ground
that the taxpayer should have gone before the assessing body or
board of review to have the error rectified. The court refuted this
contention, holding that the plaintiff "was not bound to anticipate
that the assessor would assess to it property owned by another per-
son. Such assessment made without the appellant's knowledge
was void, and it was not limited to a remedy before the board of
review."'" But merely alleging that the taxing officials made a
10. See, e.g., Lakefront Realty Corp. v. Lorenz, 19 I11. 2d 415, 417, 167 N.E.2d
236, 238 (1960); Hodge v. Glaze, 22 I11. 2d 294, 297, 174 N.E.2d 873, 874 (1961).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 500.1-500.24 (1973).
12. Id. § 500.1.
13. Id. § 500.2.
14. Id. § 500.7.
15. It should be noted that it is the duty of the title holder or owner of the bene-
ficial interest of such property (except property owned by the United States) to file
with the county assessor, on or before January 31 of each year, a certificate stating
whether there has been any change in the ownership or use of such property. Id.
§ 500.
16. See, e.g., Illinois Institute of Technology v. Skinner, 49 Il1. 2d 59, 65-66, 273
N.E.2d 371, 375 (1971); Children's Dev. Center Inc. v. Olson, 52 Ill. 2d 332, 336,
288 N.E.2d 388, 390-91 (1972).
17. 252 Ill. 348, 96 N.E. 1044 (1911).
18. Id. at 360, 96 N.E. at 1048.
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mistake in judgment and abused their discretion in arriving at
the amount of assessed valuation does not bring the case within
-the category of a tax unauthorized by law.' "It is the lack of
authority to levy the tax, not its illegality, that forms the basis for
equitable jurisdiction."20
Thus, the courts have made clear the rule that where the issue
does not concern lack of authority of the duly constituted taxing
officials, but merely the question as to the propriety of the exer-
cise of that authority, equitable intervention is not justified. A full
discussion of the relief available to the taxpayer alleging over as-
sessment will be discussed later.
The foregoing rule represents an exception to the conventional
prerequisite to equitable relief-that plaintiff have an inadequate
remedy at law. 2 This exception is a creature of the courts and
exists only where the property is exempt or -the tax is unauthorized.
In these cases, the taxpayer need not avail himself of the statutory
remedy and, in lieu thereof, may seek equitable relief.2
Thus the taxpayer has the option of seeking equitable or legal re-
lief. The equitable remedy is usually more attractive, if only for the
reason that -the taxpayer need not pay the disputed taxes as a
prerequisite to relief. However, it is theoretically possible that the
court, in exercise of its power under -the statutes applicable to in-
junction proceedings, 28 would order the plaintiff to post all or part
of the disputed taxes.2 4
Election of Remedies
Although a taxpayer may, under the proper circumstances, ob-
tain injunctive or declaratory relief without exhausting his adminis-
trative or statutory remedies, he can not have it both ways; i.e., he
19. See Lakefront Realty Corp. v. Lorenz, 19 Ill. 2d 415, 421, 167 N.E.2d 236,
239-40 (1960).
20. Hodge v. Glaze, 22 Ill. 2d 294, 297, 174 N.E.2d 873, 874 (1961).
21. See, e.g., Lackey v. Pulaski Drainage Dist., 4 Ill. 2d 72, 74, 122 N.E.2d 257,
258-59 (1954).
22. See Clarendon Assoc. v. Korzen, 56 Ill. 2d 101, 306 N.E.2d 299 (1973),
wherein this rule was reaffirmed.
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, §§ 1, et seq.
24. Such was the case in Clarendon Assoc. v. Korzen, 56 Il1. 2d 101, 106, 306
N.E.2d 299, 302 (1973), which is fully discussed in text accompanying notes 66-75
infra.
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may not avail himself of his statutory remedy, or a portion thereof,
and then abandon his pursuit of that remedy and seek equitable re-
lief. Thus, the taxpayer in Illinois Institute of Technology v.
Skinner,2" chose to pursue its statutory remedy with respect to the
taxes levied for the year 1967. Upon denial of his exemption
claim, he brought an action in chancery to enjoin collection of the
1967 tax. The Illinois Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Jus-
tice Underwood, held:
The plaintiff did choose to pursue the statutory remedy before the board
of review as to the 1967 exemption claim. In our opinion, that claim was
therefore not a proper subject for equity jurisdiction, and the judgment
must be reversed insofar as it enjoins collection of the tax for 1967.26
The rationale behind the court's decision was that although "a
court of equity will enjoin collection of a tax upon exempt prop-
erty, notwithstanding the availability of an adequate remedy at
law,"
27
[w]here an application for relief is made before the board of review, in
pursuance of the statutory remedy, then that remedy becomes exclusive
when the board denies the application. The party cannot then, after an
adverse decision, go into chancery for relief . . . having selected his forum
-- one which affords a completely adequate remedy-he must adhere to
it.28
Declaratory Relief
The leading Illinois case involving declaratory relief with respect
to taxes is Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., Inc. v. Tierney. 9 In
Goodyear, the appellant, a lessee of property owned by the United
States, argued that the assessment against its property was invalid
on the theory that the property was exempt. The appellant rea-
soned that "since the assessments were on the entire value of the
freehold, and since property of the United States of America is ex-
empt from taxation under the law of this state, the assessments of
25. Illinois Institute of Technology v. Skinner, 49 Il1. 2d 59, 273 N.E.2d 371
(1971).
26. Id. at 63, 273 N.E.2d at 374.
27. Id. at 62, 273 N.E.2d at 374.
28. Id. Accord, Sanitary Dist. v. Young, 285 Ill. 351, 370, 120 N.E. 818, 824
(1918); Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. McKibben, 385 Ill. 245, 256, 52 N.E.2d 177,
182 (1943).
29. 411 Ill. 421, 104 N.E.2d 222, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 825 (1952).
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the property to appellant were, in effect, the imposition of a tax
on exempt property."30
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the property was exempt
from taxation only in the hands of the United States Government
and not in the hands of the lessees. On that basis, the court noted
that the case was not one wherein injunctive relief would lie. The
court then proceeded to consider the question of whether the action
for a declaratory judgment could be maintained or whether the ap-
pellant was compelled to pursue its statutory remedies under the
Revenue Act. After first observing that there was no precedent
in Illinois bearing on the question of availability of declaratory re-
lief in tax cases, the court analogized the action to those brought
under the former Declaratory Judgments Act.3 '
It has been stated that the Declaratory Judgments Act is designed to sup-
ply deficiencies in legal procedure which existed before the enactment of
the statute and that such an act is not intended as a substitute for ample
remedies in use before its adoption, so that where there is another
plain, adequate and complete remedy available the statute cannot be in-
voked. . . . [lit has been held. that the remedy is adequate if the taxpayer
may pay his taxes under protest and obtain an enforcible judgment for a
refund in a judicial proceeding.3 2
While recognizing a division of authority on the question of
whether the existence of another adequate remedy precluded pro-
ceedings under the Declaratory Judgments Act in tax matters, the
Goodyear court held "that those decisions which hold that the ex-
istence of another adequate remedy is a bar to declaratory action
are supported by better reason and sounder policy.. 33  Finally, the
court alluded to the nature of the remedies afforded a taxpayer
under the Illinois Revenue Act, stating:
[Eispecially since the law was changed in 1933 to allow recovery of il-
legal taxes voluntarily paid under protest, the taxpayer in all but extra-
ordinary cases has an adequate remedy under the Revenue Act which he
should pursue in questioning the legality of assessments. In any event
we do not believe that relief should be afforded under the Declaratory
Judgments Act in any cases which would not have merited relief in equity
by injunction . . . .34
30.' Id. at 425, 104 N.E.2d at 224.
31. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 181.1 (1951).
32. 411 Ill. at 430, 104 N.E.2d at 226, citing Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.
v. Huffman,. 319 U.S. 293 (1943) (emphasis added).
33. 411 Ill. at 430, 104 N.E.2d at 226.
34. ld. See also People 'v. Jones, 39 Ill. 2d 360, 369, 235 N.E.2d 589, 594
(1968).
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Post-Tax Sale Remedies
The taxpayer who has failed to pay his tax when due is given a
subsequent, albeit often more expensive, opportunity to be heard.
Assume an order of judgment and sale has been entered and the
property subject to the tax is sold. At any time during the redemp-
tion period, 5 the taxpayer may redeem his property under protest
by paying the taxes due plus the accrued penalty and by filing
a written protest to the entry of an order directing the issuance of a
-tax deed,16 whereupon the taxpayer is entitled to a full hearing.
Subject to the above exhaustion of remedies requirement, the tax-
payer could interpose any specie of defense, not only to the ade-
quacy of notices of the tax sale or of the fact of filing the petition
for tax deed87 and service thereof, 8  but also as to the validity of
the assessment itself. Furthermore, in the case of property exempt
from taxation, the court may, on petition, order the tax sale void
as a sale in error.8 9
EXCESSIVE ASSESSMENTS
It is often the case that a tax duly authorized by law, levied on
non-exempt property, is nonetheless objectionable on the grounds
that it is based on an excessive assessment.
Constitutional Background
With respect to judicial review of excessive assessments, the Illi-
nois courts have interpreted article IX, section 1 of the Illinois Con-
stitution of 187040 as denying them the jurisdiction to review or
35. See ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 120, § 734 (1973).
36. Id. § 734, which provides, "Any person redeeming hereunder .. who desires
to preserve his right to defend against [a petition for tax deed] for any reason [may
redeem under protest]." (emphasis added).
37. Id. 9H 744, 747.
38. Id.
39. Id. § 741.
40. The General Assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful by
levying a tax, by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall
pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property-such value
to be ascertained by some person or persons, to be elected or appointed in
such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise. ...
ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1870) (emphasis added). The italicized words have been
interpreted as the source of the limitation on judicial review.
472 [Vol. 24:465
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determine the value of property for tax purposes, once such value
has been fixed by the proper administrative body. The sole ex-
ception exists in cases wherein the determination was "fraudulent." 41
A reading of article IX, section 1 does not, however, readily sug-
gest this limitation on judicial review, which appears to be solely
a creature of case law:
The provision of the constitution has respect to the laws which should be
passed by the legislature for the imposition of taxes, and not to the practi-
cal working of the laws ....
And we are of the opinion that the power does not belong to any court to
revise the assessment made by an assessor and change or set aside any
valuation of property made by him, where his judgment has been honestly
exercised and upon a right basis. To do so, would seem to be to [sic]
arrogate the power of ascertaining the value of property for taxation,
which ascertainment of value, the constitution declares, shall be by some
person or persons designated by the General Assembly, and not other-
wise. 4 2
Nonetheless, the interpretation pervades in succeeding decisions,
and has even survived the adoption of the new state constitution.
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court overruled the contention that
the rewording of that section of the 1970 Constitution,43 which sup-
planted the previous article IX, section 1, lifts the restriction on ju-
dicial review. In LaSalle National Bank v. County,4 4 the Illinois
Supreme Court, citing the debate of the delegates to the constitu-
tional convention, held:
The discussion further indicated that judicial review under the proposed
amendment would be limited to substantially the same areas that had pre-
41. See, e.g., People v. Gulf M. & O.R.R., 8 Ill. 2d 66, 69, 132 N.E.2d 544, 547
(1956).
42. Spencer & Gardner v. People, 68 Ill. 510, 512 (1873) (emphasis added);
accord, e.g., Keokuk Bridge v. People, 161 Ill. 132, 140, 43 N.E. 691, 694 (1896);
People v. Nixon, 353 Ill. 556, 573, 187 N.E. 650. 656 (1933); People & Gulf M.
& O.R.R., 8 Ill. 2d 66, 69, 132 N.E.2d 544, 547 (1956).
43. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, taxes upon real prop-
erty shall be levied uniformly by valuation ascertained as the General As-
sembly shall provide by law.
(b) Subject to such limitations as the General Assembly may hereafter pre-
scribe by law, counties with a population of more than 200,000 may classify
or to (sic) continue to classify real property for the purposes of taxation.
Any such classification shall be reasonable and assessments shall be uni-
form within each class. . ..
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 4 (1970) (emphasis added).
44. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 312 N.E.2d 252
(1974).
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viously been delineated by decisions of this court. . . . The difference in the
language used in the 1970 Constitution from that used in the 1870 Constitu-
tion, ... has not altered the scope of judicial review of real estate tax as-
sessments.
4 5
This decision ignores -the court's own caveats concerning judicial
review.
The constitution requires that such revenue as may be needed shall be
provided by the levy of a tax by valuation . . . such value. to be ascer-
tained by some person or persons to be selected or appointed as the Gen-
eral Assembly shall direct and not otherwise. While this mandate is di-
rected to the General Assembly and has respect to the laws which may be
passed for the imposition of taxes . . . yet it was held, with reference to
the substantially identical provision of the Constitution of 1848, that the
great central and dominant idea of the Constitution is uniformity of tax-
ation, and no power exists or should exist in any corporate authority to
go counter to this command of the fundamental law .... 46
Indeed, this overriding principle has been emulated in subsections
(b) and (c) of article IX, section 4 of the 1970 Constitution;4  it is
doubtful that the observation of the court in Spencer & Gardner,4"
to the effect ,that the constitution deals with "laws" rather than their
"practical working," still applies. Rather, it-appears that it is the
very application of the constitutional principles which needs judi-
cial supervision.4
The constitutional restriction is emphasized here because it ex-
plains the inconsistency of decisions involving alleged excessive as-
sessments. It forever provides a basis for judicial abstention in. such
cases, and has spawned the artificial classification of "fraudulently
excessive" assessments with which the property owner must contend.
Fraudulent and Constructively Fraudulent Assessments"
This classification is characterized as "artificial" because in
45. Id. at 329-30, 312 N.E.2d at 258.
46. People's Gas & Light Co. v. Stuckart, 286 I1. 164, 173, 121 N.E. 629, 632
(1919) (emphasis added).
47. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a), (b) (1970).
48. Spencer & Gardner v. People, 68 Ill. 510, 512 (1873). Accord, e.g., Keokuk
Bridge v. People, 161 I1. 132, 140, 43 N.E. 691, 694 (1896); People v. Nixon, 353
Il1. 556, 573, 187 N.E. 650, 656 (1933); People v. Gulf M. & O.R.R., 8 Ill. 2d 66,
69, 132 N.E.2d 544, 547 (1956).. .
49. The Illinois appellate court took cognizance of this point in M.F.M. Corp.
v. Cullerton, 16 Ill. App. 3d 681, 685, 306 N.E.2d 505, 508 (1st Dist. 1974); and"
in refusing to apply the Clarendon case, 56 Il. 2d 101, 306 N.E.2d 299, suggested
that article IX, § 4(b) does indeed require judicial supervision to insure uniformity.
474
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fact, the judicially evolved definition of a "fraudulently excessive"
assessment in this context has become an amorphous category of
ad hoc decisions, with no easily discernible pattern whatsoever. Orig-
inally, the interpretation of the term as applied to real estate
taxes was more strictly in line with the classic definition of fraud)10
mhe action of assessors, so long as they confine themselves within the
statute rule, is conclusive, however grossly they may err . . . . [I]f they
honestly estimated property too high or too low, the court would not dis-
turb the assessment. 51
In early decisions involving capital stock tax, the construction of
the term was enlarged to include what has been defined as a "con-
structively fraudulent" assessment.
[S]ince the value of property is a matter of opinion . . . it has always
been held . . . that a court of equity will never interfere to enjoin the col-
lection of a tax merely because the property has been assessed at a greater
valuation than the court would have fixed . . . . Where, however, the val-
uation is so grossly out of the way as to show that the assessor could not
have been honest in his valuation-must reasonably have known that it
was ekcessive-it is accepted as evidence of a fraud upon his part . . .
and the court will interpose.52
This rationale has since been applied to real estate taxes. 53  How-
ever, the application of this "constructive fraud" concept has pro-
duced conflicts in determining what exactly falls within its scope.
50. See 17A WORDS AND PHRASES Fraud § 3-141 (1958). See also 17A WORDS
AND PHRAsEs Fraud (Supp. 1974).
51. Spencer & Gardner v. People, 68 111. 510, 513-14 (1873) (emphasis added);
accord, Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. People, 145 Ill. 596, 605-06, 34 N.E. 482,
484; East St. L. Conn. R.R. v. People, 119 Ill. 182, 184, 10 N.E. 397, 398 (1887),
wherein the court held that the assessment must have been made with a "wilful disre-
gard. . . of a known duty" in order to be fraudulent. Id.
52. Pacific Hotel Co. v. Lieb, 83 I1. 602, 609-10 (1876), alleged to be the first
decision on constructively fraudulent assessments. Note, however, that the quoted
language is dictum in that case in that the court held that the complaint failed to
adequately allege a fraudulent assessment, id. at 612. Note also that in City of Chi-
cago v. Burtice, 24 Ill. 489 (1860), the court referred to an "outrageous valuation"
of property pursuant to a special assessment warrant, leading to the conclusion that
the valuation was fixed "for the purpose of evading" applicable limitations of the city
ordinance. See also Porter v. Rockford R.I. & St. L.R.R., 76 Ill. 561 (1874); Chi-
cago B. & Q.R.R. v. Cole, 75 Ill. 591, 592-93 (1874).
53. See, e.g., People v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 357 Ill. 173, 180-81, 191 N.E. 296,
299 (1934); People v. Gillespie, 358 Ill. 40, 46, 192 N.E. 664, 667 (1934); People's
Gas & Light Co. v. Stuckart, 286 I11. 164, 121 N.E. 629 (1919); First Nat'l Bank
v. Holmes, 246 I11. 362, 367, 92 N.E. 893, 895 (1910); People v. Turk, 391 III. 424,
427, 63 N.E.2d 513, 514 (1945); Bates v. Parker, 227 Ill. 120, 126, 81 N.E. 334,
335 (1907); Ames v. Schlaeger, 386 Ill. 160, 162, 53 N.E.2d 937, 938 (1944).
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In Peoples Gas Light Co. v. Stuckart,5 4 involving a capital stock
tax assessment, the supreme court sustained a finding of construc-
tive fraud where the taxpayer contended that the assessing body
discriminated against the taxpayer by undervaluing property of
other taxpayers in the same class.55 The court sustained this
finding even through the taxpayer's property was not alleged to be
assessed in excess of its fair market value. The court held:
[lt must be regarded as settled that intentional, systematic underevalua-
tion by state officials of other taxable property in the same class contra-
venes the constitutional right of one taxed upon the full value of his prop-
erty.56
Yet, in First National Bank v. Holmes 7 the supreme court held
that "[a] court of equity cannot intervene in behalf of a taxpayer
on the ground that the property of others has been valued too
low."58
It appears that in order for an assessment to be so excessive as to
give rise to an inference of constructive fraud, the assessed valua-
tion must be at least an integral multiple of the actual value. Thus,
in Kinderman v. Harding,5" where the assessed valuation of plain-
tiffs property was $257,731, the actual value was found by
the court to be $200,400.60 The court found that a mistake had in
fact been made, and that the assessing body had refused the taxpayer's
application to have the mistake corrected."'
There was here shown merely an error of judgment, resulting in a com-
paratively small [25%] overvaluation. For an excessive or unequal as-
sessment, where the complaint is not fraud but an error of judgment,
merely, the sole remedy is an application to such agencies as have been
provided for hearing the complaint. 62
54. 286 Ill. 164, 121 N.E. 629 (1919).
55. Id. at 165, 121 N.E.at 630.
56. Id. at 174, 121 N.E. at 632.
57. 246 Il1. 362, 369, 92 N.E. 893, 895 (1910).
58. ld. at 369, 92 N.E. at 895.
59. 345 Il1. 237, 178 N.E. 71 (1931).
60. Id. at 238, 178 N.E. at 71.
61. Id. at 241-42, 178 N.E. at 72-73.
62. Id. at 242-43, 178 N.E. at 73. The startling result of this case, in the ab-
stract, is that a conceded bona fide error in the assessor's calculation may not be cor-
rected by the courts so long as the error is within reason. Other cases denying the
existence of constructive fraud on the basis of insubstantial discrepancies are People
v. M.D.B.K.W., Inc., 36 II1. 2d 209, 221 N.E.2d 650 (1966) (assessed value:
$18,500; actual value: $10,200); East St. L. Conn. R.R. v. People, 119 111. 182, 183,
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Instances wherein constructive fraud is found to exist generally in-
clude assessed overvaluation of at least twice that of actual valu-
ation.63
Statutory, Injunctive, and Declaratory Judgment Remedies
The taxpayer, having gained access to the courts by virtue of the
"constructively fraudulent assessment" fiction, or by proving actual
fraud, has a limited scope of relief; the most extreme limitation hav-
ing been only recently judicially imposed.
The statutory relief, as provided in sections 19464 and 23565 of the
Revenue Act, applies equally to overassessments as to exempt prop-
erty and taxes unauthorized by law; the taxpayer must pay the
entire tax under protest and file objections to the application for
judgment and order of sale.
Predictably, the statute does not provide the most desirable mode
of relief for the taxpayer. However, two recent Illinois Supreme
Court decisions have effectively denied the taxpayer any other form
of relief. In Clarendon Associates v. Korzen,"6 the supreme court
re-examined, at length, its prior decisions relating to the granting
of relief by way of injunction or declaratory judgment in the case
of allegedly excessive assessments. 67  The court rationalized its
prior decisions allowing for equitable intervention in the case of ex-
cessive assessments:
10 N.E. 397, 398 (1887) (assessed value slightly less than twice actual value); Peo-
ple v. Gulf M. & O.R.R., 8 Il1. 2d 66, 132 N.E.2d 544 (1956) (alleged discriminatory
assessed valuation of approximately one and two-thirds times that of like property).
63. See, e.g., M.F.M. Corp. v. Cullerton, 16 Ill. App. 3d 681, 306 N.E.2d 505
(lst Dist. 1974) (actual value at most $365,000; assessed value $975,000); People
v. Gillespie, 358 Ill. 40, 192 N.E. 664 (1934) (actual value at most $35,000;
assessed value $70,500); People v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 357 Ill. 173, 191 N.E. 296
(1934) (actual value allegedly $157,120; assessed value $339,910); People v. Turk,
391 Ill. 424, 63 N.E.2d 513 (1945) (actual value $25,000; assessed value $82,100).
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 675 (1973).
65. Id. § 716.
66. 56 111. 2d 101, 306 N.E.2d 299 (1973).
67. As previously observed, injunctive relief can be obtained against the levying
of a tax notwithstanding the existence of the statutory remedy at law. See id. (where
the tax is unauthorized by law or the property is exempt from taxation). The funda-
mental requirement of an inadequate remedy at law, in order for equitable jurisdic-
tion to lie, is essentially waived by operation of law in these cases. Lackey v. Pulaski
Drainage Dist., 4 Ill. 2d 72, 74, 122 N.E.2d 257, 258-59 (1954).
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Prior to 1933 a taxpayer had no means of recovering a tax which had not
been paid under duress . . . . By amendments to sections 191 and 162 of
the Revenue Act of 1872, the legislature authorized payments under pro-
test of at least 75% of the tax due ...
Upon a determination of the merits of the objection the court was author-
ized to order a refund of the tax if one was due . . . . Thus, the amend-
ments protected the taxpayer by affording him a statutory remedy for the
recovery of a tax wrongfully levied ....
Although there may have been justification for granting injunctive relief in
constructively fraudulent assessment cases prior to 1933, we do not think
this should continue to be considered as an independent ground for equi-
table relief. In view of the existence of our present statutory remedy,
there is no apparent reason for continuing to afford equitable relief in
such cases unless the remedy at law is found to be inadequate ....
If a taxpayer may obtain injunctive relief from such assessments without
showing the inadequacy of the statutory remedy he would thus be en-
couraged to follow the relief provided by equity and to abandon the one
provided by law. Under the equitable remedy there is no requirement
that the tax be paid before the suit is instituted . . . . The door would
thus be opened for all constructively fraudulent cases to be tried in equity,
thereby bypassing the statutory requirement that the taxes be paid under
protest .... 68
The Clarendon court alluded to the practice of taxpayers during
the depression years; at that time, there was no requirement that
taxes be paid prior -to the filing of an objection suit. Taxpayers thus
frustrated the collection of taxes by filing objections pro forma.
Fearing a repetition of this practice in the equity courts, the Clar-
endon court all but closed the door of equity to taxpayers in over-
assessment cases. "  The court did, however, leave the door
slightly ajar:
There will be cases of fraudulently excessive assessments where the rem-
edy at law will not be adequate and injunctive relief should then be avail-
able. However, these are not such cases. The plaintiffs here have vol-
untarily paid a portion of their taxes and by order of court have paid the
balance . . . . The assessments were not so excessive as to render the
remedy at law unavailable to plaintiffs. 7 0
Thus, the court, sub silentio appears to have suggested that where
the overassessment renders the taxpayer unable to pay the taxes the
remedy at law is inadequate and equitable relief would lie.'
68. 56 I'. 2d at 107, 306 N.E.2d at 303.
69. Id. at 107, 306 N.E.2d at 302.
70. Id. at 108, 306 N.E.2d at 303.
71. Accord, Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Korzen, 20 Il. App. 3d 370, 314 N.E.2d
271 (lst Dist. 1974),
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To the extent Clarendon held out the possibility of access to courts
of equity, the same court, in LaSalle National Bank v. County,72
negated any such possibility.
In Clarendon we held that the remedy at law provided by. way of pay-
ing the taxes under protest and filing objections to the application for
judgment provides an adequate remedy at law....
The legal remedy by way of payment under protest followed by objections
to the application for judgment for delinquent taxes provides an adequate
remedy at law. . . .7
The court, in LaSalle Bank, used overly broad language in interpret-
ing Clarendon. If the statutory remedy is necessarily adequate at
law, as is stated in LaSalle Bank, then the purpose of the Claren-
don opinion, i.e., to leave open the question of the adequacy of the
statutory remedy when the taxpayer cannot pay the taxes,7 4 is vio-
lated.
The court, in LaSalle Bank also extended the Clarendon holding
to declaratory relief in overassessment cases.7 5  This decision was con-,
sistent with previous cases equating the availability of declaratory
relief with the availability of injunctive relief.
Federal Injunction Suits
Lest thetaxpayer believe that he can receive more favorable treat-
ment in the federal courts, he should be aware of the pitfalls of
seeking injunctive relief therein.
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend -or restrain the assessment,
levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and effi-
cient remedy may be had in the courts of such State. 76
This federal anti-injunction statute and the federal doctrine of ab-
stention 77 constitute, formidable obstacles, especially in light of the
fact that the statutory requirement of prepayment has been held not
to negate the existence of a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy,"
.'72...' 57 Ill. 2d 318, 312"N.E.2d 252 (1974).'
73.: Id.-at-323-24, 3i2 N.E.2d at 255-.
74. 56 Ill. 2d at 108, 306 N.E.2d at 303.
75. 57 Ill. 2d at 322, 312 N.E.2d at 254. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 57.1
(1973).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
77. See, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943);
Matthews v, Rogers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932).
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absent extraordinary circumstances.78
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The taxpayer who contests the validity of the tax or who alleges
the exempt status of his property has cumulative access to statu-
tory, injunctive, and declaratory judgment remedies, subject to
waiver of alternate remedies, once an election is made. The tax-
payer whose property is overassessed, irrespective of how gross the
error, must prepay the taxes under protest and avail himself of the
statutory remedy, all other avenues of relief now being closed.
The Clarendon and LaSalle Bank opinions should be re-exam-
ined. Aside from the further limitation apparently placed on the
court's equitable jurisdiction by LaSalle Bank, the principle previ-
ously cited by the court, that equality and uniformity of taxation is
the paramount thrust of the law, should be more emphatically re-
flected in determining the extent and nature of allowable judicial
review. The illinois Supreme Court in Clarendon and LaSalle
Bank has furthered the sacrosanct status of the determinations of
assessing bodies. While it is a legitimate desire to prevent the inun-
dation of the equity courts with injunction suits, thereby frustrating
judicial administration as well as revenue collection, the reported
decisions well document all too many instances of failures of assess-
ing bodies to perform their duties properly. Certainly a more level
balancing of equities is appropriate here, for Clarendon and La-
Salle Bank place taxpayers at the mercy of local assessing bodies.
The language of subsections (b) and (c) of section 4 of article IX
of the 1970 Constitution affords the courts the opportunity to alter
their century-old policy of non-intervention and thereby assure that
uniformity of taxation be accorded to all taxpayers.
78. See, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943);
Mathews v. Rogers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932); Helmsley v. City of Detroit, 320 F.2d 476
(6th Cir., 1963).
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